

29 October 1972 (2130)

Dear Al,

Enclosed are three documents: a typed manuscript and two ~~marked~~ identically marked up texts of the agreement draft. This constitutes the first of the four projects Henry asked me to undertake yesterday.

Would you please have a girl type up my Memo in a form suitable for submission. To the typed-up memo should be attached the cleaner copy of the marked up draft text. Should you also if it is finished in time, I can proof and sign the memo right after the 30 October WSAG. Would you ~~also~~ please make one copy of the memo for me. Also would you please hold the "WORK COPY" of the marked up draft text for me in your safe. I do not want to take it out of the White House, for obvious reasons, but would like to have it when time and the course of events erase current security strictures.

Four other points in connection with the Memo and its attachment:

- 1) Please check the spelling of the Vietnamese term that should be used for "administrative structure". I think it is "hanh chinh", but the accurate spelling can be found in the note on this subject I

I checked
4:15 a.m.
"hanh
chinh"
is correct

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(2)

gave you Saturday afternoon (28 Oct).

The term appears near the end of

Para 5 of my covering memo and

on page 8 of the draft text.

2) Someone who knows what he is talking about should take a careful look at the second paragraph of Article 2 (page 3) and make sure we are not making a commitment on which we can not deliver. My understanding -- which may well be wrong -- is that the Mark 36 Detonators were (a) sown at random (i.e., no one knows precisely where each and every one may be located) and (b) can not be deactivated.

3) A parochial point, but an important one to us. Does the language in the last sentence of the current draft text's Article 5 appearing near the top of page 5 -- "Advisers from the above mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police force [SIC, you really should have a final "s"] will also be withdrawn within -- the same period of time" -- encompass our case officers working with the GUN's police and intelligence services? If so (as is probably the case), we are not fighting the language, but will certainly need to discuss the situation and problems it creates.

(3)

4) Finally, I saw no plausible way to slip such language into the actual text; but it would certainly be helpful if when negotiating the agreement's final text we could somehow make it pointedly clear that Communist efforts to grab territory between the time of signing and moment of cease-fire implementation would be regarded by us as ~~unfriendly~~ unfriendly acts, very much against the spirit of these agreements and likely to have (say) a decidedly adverse effect on our receptivity to Communist claims for post-war assistance.

Henry has asked for three other projects. Their status is as follows: I will try to send him the "how could we make it a victory" paper. Sometime tomorrow (30 Oct). He will get the South Vietnam Action Check-list on Tuesday, 31 October. The suggested formulations for ~~the~~ inspection teams will be down at about the same time. On the latter, even a cursory look at the problem makes it abundantly clear that if you want to monitor compliance with the agreement's non reinforcement provisions, teams confined to South Vietnam will do you little good. There will simply have to be ICES teams in Cambodia and Laos plus -- ideally -- a team in Vinh.

Regards,

[Signature]